Apr 2024, research
Interpretability and Explainability in Generative AI
Hallucination, misgeneralization, bias and adversarial attacks, and what interpretability offers against them
Why I wrote it
I wrote this review in April 2024. Generative AI was moving into banking, healthcare, autonomous systems and connected devices, and the models underneath it were black boxes: nobody could say in advance how one would react to an input it had not seen, which means failures and unwanted biases arrive without warning. The review asks what interpretability research had to offer against that, and how much of it was in use.
It is a literature review, a single-author survey that draws on 14papers in the literature review's reference listThe reference list on the review's last two pages; some are surveys cited for context.Source: Literature review, 21 April 2024 papers. Every framework described below is the work of the authors the review cites. What is mine is the reading, the synthesis and the conclusion. The full text, with its reference list, is linked in the facts column.
The failure modes
The review starts from the ways these systems go wrong. It names hallucination, misgeneralization and bias. Prompt injection manipulates a language model into unintended actions or malicious output, and the review calls it a growing concern as more applications are built on those models. Deepfakes and disinformation threaten whole information ecosystems with content that is convincing and fabricated. Confidential data leakage sits beside them in the conclusion's list of threats.
Its argument is that deploying these models calls for governance and responsible-AI practice whose defences are robust, comprehensive and multi-faceted, and that evolve alongside frontier AI. Interpretability and explainability are where the review looks for that.
Interpretability and explainability
The review separates the terms. Interpretability, as it uses the word, is the extent to which cause and effect can be observed in a system: a user can follow the model's reasoning and verify that it is making decisions for the right reasons, which is what trust and debugging need. Explainability is the ability to describe a system's internal mechanics, parameters and architecture, which is what improving a model needs.
That is the distinction I used then; the review states it without citing a source for it. Other literatures use the same words the other way round, with interpretability meaning the study of a model's internals. The distinction matters more than the labels: checking that a system is right for the right reasons is a different job from describing its machinery, and a method can do one without the other.
The review also states the tension plainly, from a chart in one of the surveys it cites: the model families that are easiest to explain, such as decision trees, have the lowest predictive performance, and deep networks are the reverse. Another of its surveys found that explainable AI lacked uniform measurements and evaluation procedures, which is the thread the conclusion picks up.
What the field was proposing
The rest of the review reports what researchers were proposing at the time. In the order the review takes them:
- A defence framework against deepfakes, misinformation and disinformation that combines detection algorithms, cross-platform collaboration and policy with multi-modal analysis, digital watermarking and machine-learning-based authentication.
- INTERACTION, a generative explanation framework for natural-language inference that first explains and predicts a label, then generates diverse evidence, because a single explanation does not account for the variety in how people reason in language.
- SVEAD, which compresses data with a variational autoencoder, combines an ensemble of anomaly detectors, and explains the result with SHAP, permutation importance and individual conditional expectations.
- An evaluation framework for an application's resilience to prompt injection. Simulated attacks are chosen for coverage and relevance, a second language model assesses each response and returns a confidence score with an explanation, which a conventional malicious-content classifier cannot do, and attacks are weighted by impact into one resilience score. Its authors found newer models more resilient than older ones, and needed only small adjustments to take in new kinds of attack.
- Galeras, a benchmarking strategy for language models that write code. Earlier benchmarks compared generated code with expected code and ignored confounders such as lines of code, token count and prompt size; evaluating with causal inference reduced that bias.
- xAI-GAN, which uses explanation systems to change how a generative adversarial network is trained, so that the generator gets richer feedback on why the discriminator decided as it did.
- SAFE, for counterfactual explanations in safety-critical settings. Generative counterfactual models had been altering features a user selected, which may sit nowhere near the decision boundary and so defeat the purpose of a counterfactual; SAFE uses saliency maps to change only the regions that decide the output.
- CureNet, a clinician-in-the-loop explanation tool that combines deep-learning models, a fine-tuned language model and attribution methods (Integrated Gradients, layer-wise relevance propagation, DeepLift) to draw heatmaps of the regions behind a diagnosis.
- A diagnostic framework that pairs Markov logic networks, for medical reasoning a person can read, with knowledge extracted by language models and a search engine.
- Group Additive Gaussian Processes, an interpretable model for tracking economic indicators from social-media data, with calibrated uncertainty on its predictions.
- FCEN, a fuzzy network for reinforcement learning that writes an agent's state-to-action mappings as if-then rules and adds a generative model to visualize what the agent has learned, explaining its decision logic both globally and for a single decision.
Where it fell short
The review's own verdict is that none of these methods had been widely deployed in practice, and that a great deal of research was still to be done. Along the way it records that the field had no uniform way to measure an explanation, and, from the causal-inference work, that the benchmarks used to measure the models could themselves be confounded by the way the test was built.
What I took from it
The review ends in a position. Before generative models are trusted with problems that matter, standardized interpretability and explainability metrics need to be implemented and rigorously followed, with the assessment criteria weighted differently for different application industries and types of model. It names safety-critical and high-reliability systems as the place this matters most, because that is where a model that predicts wrongly, or is jailbroken, could lead to catastrophic outcomes.
My honours thesis had reached the same place from the other side: an explanation method has to be scored before it is trusted. The review is where I found that the rest of the field was short of the same thing, an agreed way to measure.